Bizzell, P. “Arguing About Literacy.” College English 50.2 (1988): 141–153. Print.
Summary
In this 1988 essay, Bizzell offers a rhetorical analysis of the foundationalist arguments about the nature of language and academic literacy, purported by those who wish to silence questions about the politically repressive nature of academic literacies as they are currently defined in order to preserve the status quo. She looks to those who describe the literacy problem from the humanist and social science perspectives, and critiques their dichotomies and their inability to see their own ideological defining of all literacy based on the academic literacy they value–including Farrell (143-4). She then turns to those like E. D. Hirsh who recognize the cultural nature of literacy, but respond in ways that still conceal political consequences thereof. Finally, she argues for an understanding of literacy that attends to its historically and rhetorically constructed nature, while acknowledging the impact of that construction. This is in part based on her assessment that what we know is establish rhetorically from that which has been persuasive (149).
Understanding literacy as rhetorically constructed, Bizzell sees room for teachers and students to take agency in shaping and defining academic literacy, though this task is complicated by the unequal power among the collaborators (150). Ultimately, while the resistance needs to happen out of the individual will of the students (to avoid the power of change being “granted” to students, and thus bypassing their agency), Bizzell warns against falling back into the foundationalist or determinist traps. Rather, she concludes, we need to recognize “that this process constitutes ‘normal’ intellectual life. The crucial moment in the inculcation of cultural literacy will be finding ways to persuade our students to participate in this life with us” (152).
Quotes
Humanists argue that the single set of changes they see as characteristic of all literacy is always attendant upon the acquisition of literacy and is independent of social variables. They assert that the change from oral thinking to literate think- ing can be achieved only through acquisition of alphabetic literacy, and that it is always achieved when alphabetic literacy has been acquired. These two assertions, however, have not been confirmed among variously literate contemporary peoples. [...] Typically, however, humanist literacy scholars do not acknowledge their conflation of literacy and academic literacy. Thus not only do they reduce all possible cognitive gains attendant upon literacy acquired in various social circumstances to the narrow set of abilities associated with academic literacy, but they also foster arguments that any cognitive gains to be had from any kind of literacy are available only from mastery of academic literacy. (143-4)
Hirsch adopts a determinist view of the power of history. He seems to say that both the content of the academic canon and our attitudes about the rightness of its dominance have been fixed by the past life of the society that has formed us. We may be able to make minor changes, but basically, we must submit. If one believes this, then there is no objection to teaching in the most indoctrinating fashion possible. What students lack is canonical knowledge: let’s give it to them. (148)
If we see the production of literacy as a collaborative effort-if we adopt a rhetorical perspective on literacy, which dialectically relates means of persuasion to audience’s canonical knowledge-then we need a pedagogy much less prescriptive than Hirsch’s or Farrell’s. Teaching academic literacy becomes a process of constructing academic literacy, creating it anew in each class through the interaction of the professor’s and the students’ cultural resources. I would argue that this is in fact what happens, very slowly-hence the increasing pluralism in academic literacy noted earlier. (150)
We have to be careful here not to fall back into a “foundationalist” way of arguing about change. If the power of an individual to effect change is qualified, if opportunities for oppositionally motivated change are contingent upon historical circumstances “erupting” into the academic community, this does not mean that change is now out of human hands. Rather, we should understand that change is always immanent but becomes evident when the time is right-and when those who wish to effect change are willing and able to engage in the rhetorical processes that make change happen. That is, those who support change must persuade other members of the academic community that the prevailing notion of academic literacy needs revision. We should not expect those with a critical perspective on prevailing notions to be any more able to transcend historical circumstances than the supporters of the dominant culture are-to wish for this power is to fantasize avoiding the rhetorical process. (151-2)






